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ABSTRACT: California was the first state to create its own health insurance exchange after 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Because of its front-runner status and the sheer 
size of its coverage expansion, California’s choices will have implications for other states 
as they address difficult issues, including minimizing adverse selection, promoting cost-
conscious consumer choice, and seamlessly coordinating with public programs. California 
took advantage of the flexibility in the federal health reform law to create an exchange that 
will function as an active purchaser in the marketplace; take significant steps to combat 
adverse selection both against and within the exchange, including requiring all insurers 
to sell all tiers of products and making exchange participation a condition of selling cata-
strophic plans; and allow community-based health plans to develop commercial offerings 
for the exchange. This brief examines these decisions, which will provide a roadmap for 
other states as they set up their exchanges.
            
OVERVIEW
On September 30, 2010, just six months after the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act, California became the first state in the nation to create its own insurance 
exchange in response to the provisions of federal health care reform. On April 20, 
2011, the Board of the California Health Benefit Exchange held its first meeting. 
Although its fifth and final member had yet to be appointed, the board hired an 
interim director and outlined an ambitious process to develop a comprehensive 
business plan and budget for the exchange.
This accelerated timeline is consistent with California’s desire to be, in 
the words of the state’s Health and Human Services secretary and Exchange 
board chair Diana Dooley, the “lead car” in implementation of federal health 
care reform.1 Because of the speed with which it has approached this task as well 
as the sheer size of its coverage expansion, the decisions California has made 
will be influential both regionally and nationally. What transpires in the state 
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will have implications for other states as they address 
difficult issues, including minimizing adverse selec-
tion, promoting cost-conscious consumer choice, and 
seamlessly coordinating with public programs.2,3 This 
brief reports on California’s decisions, evaluates the 
likelihood that these choices will advance the goal of 
providing affordable access to high-quality care, and 
analyzes the extent to which these decisions can serve 
as a blueprint for other states.
Federal legislation purposely gives states flex-
ibility to craft their own insurance exchanges, entities 
that organize a marketplace of standardized insurance 
products for consumers. California took advantage of 
this leeway by:
•	 creating an exchange that will function as an active 
purchaser in the marketplace, rather than simply 
as a centralized portal for people to shop for subsi-
dized health insurance;
•	 taking significant steps to combat adverse selection 
both against and within the exchange, including 
requiring all insurers to sell all tiers of products 
and making exchange participation a condition of 
selling catastrophic plans; and
•	 choosing not to preclude community-based health 
plans from developing commercial offerings for 
the exchange.
These decisions will help provide a roadmap 
for other states as they set up their own health insur-
ance exchanges. Their influence will be tempered 
somewhat by the unique nature of California, including 
its size, demographic profile, and private health insur-
ance market characteristics (Exhibit 1). In Los Angeles 
County alone, there are nearly 700,000 people who 
will be eligible for subsidized health insurance through 
the individual exchange, a larger group than the entire 
uninsured population in many states.4 Overall, recent 
estimates project that by 2016 there will be 3.77 mil-
lion people newly covered in California through the 
exchange and the Medicaid expansion. However, 
3.1 million individuals will remain uninsured in part 
because of the state’s high percentage of undocu-
mented persons, another factor that differentiates 
California from other states.5
Exhibit 1. Seven Million Californians Are Currently Uninsured
32.6 million Californians, 
0–64 years old
7 million uninsured Californians,               
0–64 years old
California’s nonelderly population by insurance status, 2008–2009
Note: FPL refers to Federal Poverty Level; ESI refers to Employer-Sponsored Insurance.
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, Statehealthfacts.org, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/proleind.jsp?cmprgn=1&cat=3&rgn=6&ind=125&sub=39.
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California’s Policy Process
Soon after the passage of federal reform, the legisla-
tive leadership in California introduced its own bills 
and moved very quickly to pass them. The legislation 
signed into law in California in September 2010 con-
sisted of two bills. A state Senate bill established the 
basic governance and structure of the exchange, and 
a state Assembly bill outlined its activities and put in 
place insurance market regulations, some of which 
apply even to carriers who do not participate in the 
exchange.6 
Building an exchange is an arduous and com-
plex task. For the exchange to be successful, it must 
minimize adverse selection among the carriers who 
participate in the exchange and between the exchange 
and the outside market, create a system that helps facil-
itate access to private insurance and public programs, 
and operate effectively alongside many established 
interests, including insurance carriers, health insurance 
brokers, consumer advocates, and Medicaid managed 
care programs. 
Fortunately, as pointed out by Kim Belshé, the 
former state secretary of Health and Human Services 
and current California Health Benefit Exchange board 
member, the state was “not starting from scratch.”7 
Many of the members of the core team that shep-
herded this bill through the legislative process had 
been involved in insurance market reforms for almost 
two decades. California’s choices were informed by its 
own experiences designing and running other purchas-
ing pools. These included the state children’s health 
insurance program, administered by the Managed Risk 
Medical Insurance Board; the now-defunct small-busi-
ness purchasing pool, initially run by the government 
as the Health Insurance Plan of California and eventu-
ally administered by the nonprofit Pacific Business 
Group on Health as PacAdvantage; and the public 
employee retirement system, CalPERS, which pur-
chases health insurance on behalf of state employees.8 
During 2007 and 2008, California debated a compre-
hensive health reform proposal that ultimately failed to 
pass. The final version of the proposal included plans 
for an exchange to be called the California Cooperative 
Health Insurance Purchasing Program.
Key state actors
During California’s process of passing the enabling leg-
islation, leaders in Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s 
administration and in the state legislature played 
important roles. The day-to-day activities, includ-
ing drafting the bill and engaging with stakeholders, 
though, were led by a very experienced team of legisla-
tive and administration staff, working in close consul-
tation with outside consultants with established exper-
tise in designing and running exchanges.9 This work 
received support from philanthropic foundations and 
involved the participation of a broad range of stake-
holders, many of whom had been involved in insurance 
market reform for many years.10
On one of the central issues for the exchange—
that is, whether it would serve as an active purchaser 
that negotiates the best price for enrollees—there was 
agreement among the political principals in the legis-
lature and the administration. In initial conversations, 
Governor Schwarzenegger made it clear that he wanted 
the exchange to negotiate the best prices possible for 
enrollees. The political principals in the administration 
and legislature also agreed that they wanted to allow 
the board as much flexibility as possible. 
There was a great deal of accord among the 
principals and staff of the Democratic-controlled legis-
lature and the Republican Schwarzenegger administra-
tion, and the legislative process moved very quickly. 
Nevertheless, a substantial amount of organized oppo-
sition was brought to bear at key points. Success can-
not be taken for granted—even in a state where there is 
broad agreement among political leaders.
Political and fiscal context
It was uncertain whether Governor Schwarzenegger 
would sign the bill, despite the intense involvement 
of his team in drafting it. This was partly because the 
California Chamber of Commerce called the bill a 
“job-killer” and the governor had historically vetoed 
most bills so termed. There were also strong concerns 
expressed by members of the governor’s inner circle 
about the impact of the program on state resources. 
While the federal government will pay for the develop-
ment and planning of the exchange and the lion’s share 
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of the costs associated with the Medicaid expansion 
until 2019, the state’s ongoing fiscal stress remains rel-
evant. Recently, newly elected Governor Jerry Brown 
proposed and the Democratic-controlled state legisla-
ture passed $1.6 billion in cuts to the state Medicaid 
program based on the assumption that these cuts will 
be paired with tax increases that are by no means cer-
tain.11 Some observers find it difficult to square the 
state cutting back on its current set of commitments 
and activities to lower-income Californians while 
simultaneously planning to increase others. 
With severe constraints on state resources, it 
is vital to develop exchange designs that offer the best 
chance for success. California’s experience with its 
failed small-business purchasing pool demonstrates 
that there is no guarantee these entities will be success-
ful. It is very important, in particular, to structure the 
markets inside and outside of the exchange to avoid 
adverse selection. It is also important to partner across 
parties and stakeholder groups as it is in no one’s inter-
est to create a program that fails to fulfill its public 
purpose while simultaneously disrupting the private 
insurance market. Conversely, a well-designed and 
administered exchange may improve the entire insur-
ance market and drive change in the medical delivery 
system.
California’s Key Decisions
The following section describes some of the key deci-
sions California made and examines whether and how 
they can serve as a roadmap for other states (Exhibit 2).
Structure and governance
California’s legislation established an exchange struc-
ture consistent with Timothy Jost’s recommendation 
that the entity “should be placed within an indepen-
dent agency, which should be explicitly exempted, as 
necessary, from specific state administrative law or 
government operations requirements.”12 Critically, the 
enabling legislation grants the exchange some exemp-
tions to state personnel and contracting procedures and 
gives its board the power to promulgate regulations on 
an emergency basis for two years. There was very little 
disagreement on this point among the main political 
actors in the state. They agreed a nonprofit structure 
would be unlikely to provide adequate transparency 
and accountability to the public. This, in turn, could 
undermine the exchange’s legitimacy.
There are important trade-offs involved in 
this choice, however. The state’s government-run, 
small-business purchasing pool, the Health Plan of 
California, was transitioned after several years to the 
nonprofit Pacific Business Group on Health. Although 
this venture was ultimately unsuccessful, it was viewed 
as better run and more tightly managed when it was 
operated by a nonprofit. The decision-making process 
became shorter and faster, leading to a substantial 
increase in responsiveness to market changes. Some 
stakeholders pointed out that one of the main reasons 
this purchasing pool had to be shut down was that its 
transition out of state control disconnected it from the 
policy process. This prevented state policymakers from 
having adequate notice to make legislative or regula-
tory changes that could have kept the pool viable, 
including, for example, the price parity requirements 
ultimately included in federal reform.
The need for nimble participation in the mar-
ket was also one of the main reasons for having a 
five-member board—a much smaller board than 
the Massachusetts Health Connector as well as the 
exchange boards envisioned in other states.13 The 
state program that administers California’s purchas-
ing pool for children has a five-member board, which 
has worked well. The California statute also has very 
strong conflict-of-interest provisions for the board and 
does not allow anyone who currently draws money 
from an entity that could receive funding from the 
exchange (e.g., a provider or carrier) to serve as a 
member. However, the staff who designed this provi-
sion subsequently commented that they regretted mak-
ing the conflict-of-interest provisions so stringent.
An analysis performed for the California 
Chamber of Commerce strongly critiqued the leeway 
given to the California Health Benefit Exchange board. 
Specifically, it raised the concern that the board’s activ-
ities could create significant general fund liability for 
the state by increasing the scope of essential benefits 
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within the state and by unilaterally enrolling people in 
the state’s Medicaid programs.14 Independent groups, 
including the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office, 
pointed out that this conclusion appeared to be in direct 
contradiction to the plain language of the statute, which 
was written to protect the general fund, left authority to 
determine mandated benefits with the legislature, and 
required the exchange to coordinate with existing pub-
lic programs on issues of eligibility and enrollment.15,16 
Other states should carefully examine the decisions 
California made in this area to strike a balance between 
accountability and flexibility for the board.
The board will also have to carefully weigh the 
balance between hiring additional state personnel to 
build out and perform the functions of the exchange 
and developing relationships with vendors. The expe-
rience with California’s public programs, as well as 
within the Massachusetts and Utah exchanges, suggests 
that there will be instances in which the state will look 
to partner with other entities. One influential decid-
ing factor is the tight timeline necessary to get up and 
Exhibit 2. California’s Key Decisions
Federal Law California
Federal, regional,  
or state
Exchange can be set up by federal government, 
state, or regional consortium of states
Legislation signed on September 30, 2010, established the California 
Health Benefit Exchange
Structure The exchange can be either a government agency or a nonprofit organization
Stand-alone government agency 
Exempt from some state personnel and procurement requirements 
Temporary emergency regulatory authority
Subject to open meeting laws, except for discussions pertaining to certain 
legal, contracting issues
Governance No specific guidance
Five-member board: secretary of Health and Human Services, two 
gubernatorial appointees, and two legislative appointees
Strict conflict of interest requirements, unpaid
Number of 
exchanges
Individual and small-group exchanges can be 
pooled or separate
Separate individual and small-business exchanges (each with dedicated 
staff but administered by same board)
Legislation requires study on topic of merging exchanges, to be presented 
in 2018
Size of small 
businesses
Small-group market can be limited to 50 
employees before 2016
To be determined; pending legislation may reconcile regulation within two 
to 50 and 51 to 100 markets
Payment of 
premiums
Consumers may pay premiums to insurers or 
to the exchange
Exchange may choose to collect premiums directly from individuals
Will collect premiums directly from businesses
Purchasing Broad range of options from passive to active
Exchange can selectively contract with specific insurance carriers, 
excluding others as long as criteria for selection are consistent
Exchange is an active purchaser seeking to promote “optimal combination 
of choice, value, quality, and service”
Reducing adverse 
selection
All plans participating in exchange must offer 
silver and gold plans
Insurers both inside and outside the exchange must offer all tiers of 
products
Only carriers participating in exchange can offer catastrophic plans
May require participating plans to offer additional products
Board may standardize products
Coordination with 
public programs
Exchange must inform individuals of eligibility 
for public programs
Exchange must help coordinate enrollment in public programs
Must assist in providing continuity of coverage for people who lose 
eligibility for subsidies or public programs
Community-based health plans (Medicaid managed care plans) able to 
participate in commercial exchange
Exchange funding
After initial grants, must be self-sustaining 
by 2015; can be funded by surcharge on 
premiums, assessment on plans, businesses 
or individuals or state general fund dollars
Activities funded primarily by an assessment of fee on insurers who 
participate
Exchange required to refund assessment if it exceeds annual budget 
(cannot amass surplus)
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running. Many of the California Health and Human 
Services Agency staff wear “2014 Is Tomorrow” but-
tons. Creating an exchange is a massive undertaking, 
even for a state like California that has gotten a signifi-
cant jump on the process. A multitude of issues will 
require the time and attention of board and staff. 
Number of insurance markets and exchanges
One of the first decisions states must make is whether 
to have an individual insurance market outside the 
exchange. States that want to ensure the exchange is 
not affected by adverse selection can substantially 
reduce this concern by removing the outside market, 
but this decision may be politically infeasible.17,18 Even 
in California, where there is wide support for federal 
reform and a broad cross-section of stakeholders issued 
a report calling for a sole-source exchange, this option 
was not seriously considered.19 However, whether or 
not states eliminate the outside market, the exchange 
may over time swallow much of the individual mar-
ket as the exchange is the only place consumers will 
receive subsidies. 
Separate small-business exchange. States will also 
have to consider the option of combining the indi-
vidual and small-group exchanges. There are techni-
cal challenges to doing so since many states have 
different regulations, products, and carriers for these 
markets. However, there are also strong policy reasons 
to combine the exchanges, particularly in states in 
which exchanges will not develop a large enough risk 
pool. This was not a big issue in California because 
of the size of the state. California decided to leave its 
exchanges as separate pools in part because of the dis-
tinct nature of these two markets. The California leg-
islation specified, however, that a report be delivered 
to the legislature in 2018 making a recommendation 
about whether these markets should be merged.
There is enthusiasm among small-business 
owners in California related to the promise of the 
small-group exchange in spite of the state’s uneven 
experience with purchasing pools. According to John 
Arensmeyer, CEO of Small Business Majority, “When 
we tell small-business owners about the exchange 
provisions in the Affordable Care Act, there is tremen-
dous interest, and one-third say that an exchange will 
make it more likely that they will offer coverage.” On 
the other hand, there is no penalty in the law for groups 
with fewer than 50 employees that do not provide 
insurance. Some have discussed the possibility of ceas-
ing to offer insurance in favor of increasing employees’ 
salaries, many of whom would qualify for subsidies to 
purchase insurance on the individual exchange.
The primary value proposition of small-group 
exchanges has been a broader range of choices than 
in the outside market. In California and other states, 
the trade-off for this choice is that the plans offered 
through small-group exchanges have generally been 
more expensive than comparable plans in the outside 
market. These exchanges, therefore, have tended to 
cater to a niche clientele. Some businesses are will-
ing to pay the relatively higher premiums to get this 
set of choices. One of the most popular products in 
PacAdvantage, California’s defunct small-group pur-
chasing pool, was PairedChoice. This option allowed 
employers to combine a Kaiser HMO plan, generally 
offered to their employees, with a PPO plan, generally 
taken up by the owners and their relatives.
Because the California statute requires insur-
ers to offer the same products at the same price inside 
and outside the exchange, the exchange will not be at 
a price disadvantage relative to the outside market in 
the same way that exchanges like PacAdvantage have 
been. It is still unresolved, though, whether employers 
will have the option of making the plan-choice decision 
for their employees or whether “subscriber choice” will 
be required, meaning that all employees select their 
own plan, likely at a specified actuarial tier. Neither the 
federal nor the California legislation appears to require 
either arrangement for small businesses. The exchange 
will have to decide which is the most appealing to the 
market, most likely to fulfill the public purpose of the 
exchange, and most likely to be viable from a business 
perspective. 
The small-group exchange will need to 
develop a value proposition that appeals to small busi-
nesses and insurers alike. Small-group exchanges have 
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historically struggled to attract and retain the participa-
tion of insurers. Some observers expressed concern that 
the main value proposition of the Affordable Care Act 
small-group exchange for insurance carriers—access to 
groups that utilize a modest tax credit that expires after 
two years—may not be adequate to attract their busi-
ness. Insurers generally prefer not to split the business 
of a small group with another carrier. If the exchange 
offers subscriber choice, it would slice business 
that many insurers would prefer to have combined. 
Therefore, they may continue to prefer selling policies 
in the market outside the exchange.
Another critical issue is the relationship among 
the exchanges and the health insurance agents who 
serve this market. The small-group exchange is more 
likely to be successful if it enrolls a great number 
of people, and brokers have the broadest and most 
well-established set of relationships with the small-
group market. In this area, California’s made a choice 
consistent with the national recommendations from 
Tim Jost: “State enabling legislation should neither 
require nor bar the use of agents and brokers for the 
purchase of insurance from the exchange.”20 Figuring 
out the role of brokers in the exchange and how they 
operate with the “navigators” who will receive grants 
from the exchange to promote enrollment will be a key 
task for the exchange board and staff. 
Size of the small-group market
An option available to states from 2014 to 2016 is 
to temporarily limit the size of employers who can 
participate in the small-group exchange to those with 
50 or fewer employees. In 2016, it will expand to up 
to 100 employees in all states. California has yet to 
resolve this issue; the latest guidance suggests that the 
Selective Contracting and Active Purchasing in California
Medi-Cal Managed Care. California engages in active negotiation with entities that manage the health ser-
vices of the enrollees in the state’s Medicaid program. There are several different models in the state, including 
county-organized health systems and “two-plan” counties with a public and private offering. The County Medical 
Services Program purchases services on behalf of enrollees in 34 rural counties. 
Healthy Families. The state’s stand-alone children’s health insurance program, which covers children in families 
with incomes of up to 250 percent of the federal poverty level, has a history of selective contracting, active purchas-
ing, and contracting for services that is similar to what is expected in the exchange. The five-member Managed 
Risk Medical Insurance Board oversees this program, as well as the state’s pre- and post-reform high-risk pools. 
PacAdvantage. In 1993, the state established the Health Plan of California, a small-group purchasing pool that 
was transitioned to a nonprofit and administered by the Pacific Business Group on Health. It was a selective con-
tractor and active purchaser. It was the victim of adverse selection and ceased operations in 2006.
CalPERS. The state’s public employee retirement system has a type of exchange similar to the California Health 
Benefits Exchange in that subsidies are provided for the purchase of insurance. Many observers are concerned 
about this parallel because this purchasing pool has narrowed the choice for public employees from eight or nine 
plans to two or three. 
California Cooperative Health Insurance Purchasing Program (Cal-CHIPP). California’s ultimately unsuc-
cessful state-based comprehensive health care reform plan called for the creation of a purchasing pool that 
would have received bids from insurers, created a variety of benefit plan designs, and required an employer con-
tribution in many cases.
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California Health Benefit Exchange board may have 
the leeway to limit enrollment to smaller groups with-
out further legislative action. 
In California, as in many other states, this pres-
ents challenges for implementation. In California, the 
small-group market (i.e., two to 50 individuals) is age-
rated, whereas the midsize market (i.e., 51 to 100 indi-
viduals) is community-rated. The practical implication 
is that the premiums for individuals, and hence for the 
group, can be different across these market segments. 
The technical requirements for producing the premi-
ums for these two markets are distinct and combining 
them without standardizing the underlying law would 
be very challenging, if not prohibitively complicated. 
At its first board meeting, the exchange put this issue 
on the agenda for the near future.
The natural default for many states may be to 
restrict the size of the market for the first two years 
as these technical issues are worked out. However, 
an exchange set up to cater to the traditional small-
group market exclusively, even for a limited time, may 
make different decisions than an exchange planning to 
serve groups of up to 100 individuals. These markets 
often have different structures, are served by distinct 
delivery channels, have varying compensation sched-
ules for agents, and carry different customer service 
expectations. Further, for states that are smaller than 
California, it may not be feasible to limit the size of 
groups that can participate because of concerns about 
the total size of the market.
Exchange as purchaser
Perhaps the most critical decision states will make 
about structuring their exchanges is whether they will 
be “passive” or “active.” A passive exchange is a cen-
tralized place where people can learn about coverage 
options. In the active model, the individual and small-
group purchasing pools will negotiate separately or 
collectively with insurance plans and work with these 
carriers to design products that are appealing to their 
enrollees. This was one of the more contentious issues 
in California and is likely to be even more controver-
sial in other states. 
California made the choice to allow the 
exchange to be an active purchaser with the ability to 
selectively contract with certain insurers. Specifically, 
the California law directs that “in the course of selec-
tively contracting for health care coverage offered to 
qualified individuals and qualified small employers 
through the exchange, the board shall seek to contract 
with carriers so as to provide health care coverage 
choices that offer the optimal combination of choice, 
value, quality, and service.” 
Because California has a tradition of active 
purchasing through its children’s health insurance 
program, small-business purchasing pool, and state 
employee purchasing pool, policymakers were build-
ing on an established history. The lesson for other 
states, however, is not necessarily that they should all 
choose for their exchanges to be active purchasers. 
Rather, they should let the decision in this critical area 
be driven—as California’s was—by the experiences 
of their state, as well as by the nature and structure of 
their private insurance markets. 
For an exchange to be successful it must have 
broad public support and able to attract an adequate 
number of covered lives. California is distinct in 
important ways from other states both politically and 
demographically. In other states, an exchange may 
have to work hard to attract 100,000 people to the 
pool. This size is critical if the entities do not want to 
get “upside-down” on risk and keep the administrative 
load per enrollee to a minimum. This is less of a prob-
lem in California where it is likely that the exchange 
will have at least 1 million to 2 million lives in private 
insurance coverage served by five or six major insur-
ers, regardless of the choices it makes.
Another critical distinction is the number of 
insurers in the market. In states where there are one 
or two insurers that dominate, selective contracting 
in particular may not be feasible. In these states, poli-
cymakers may want to focus on developing nonprofit 
co-ops to increase competition through the develop-
ment of new carriers.21 On the other hand, in other 
large states where there is significant insurance market 
competition, setting up an exchange with the ability to 
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work actively with other payers to reduce costs may 
make good business sense. If policymakers in these 
states choose not to create an exchange with active pur-
chasing powers, they may miss an opportunity to bring 
down costs on behalf of their enrollees. 
There are some lessons of caution from 
California’s experience in selective contracting. While 
the public employee retirement system that purchases 
health care on behalf of its workers previously had 
eight to 10 choices for employees, it now has two or 
three. It is not clear that the board continues to feel 
that it has good bargaining power with the remaining 
insurers, because it would be extremely difficult to 
exclude any of the remaining plans from the pool going 
forward. These insurers do have a large book of busi-
ness with the state, which would seem to be a recipe 
for enhanced bargaining power for the state. However, 
it is not primarily the size of a group that determines its 
negotiating leverage. Utilization of health care services 
among enrollees is a major driver of rates, and the high 
prevalence of chronic disease among state workers, 
because of their higher relative age, drives rates up for 
this group.
The flip side of having a smaller number of 
carriers is that these strong relationships present the 
potential for partnership. In California, this led to the 
development of a unique offering to state employees in 
the Sacramento region: access to a virtually integrated 
delivery system, a partnership between Blue Shield 
of California, Catholic HealthCare West, and Hill 
Physicians group. This alliance has kept premium costs 
stable for the employees who choose it and has been 
working to integrate the different systems and improve 
quality of care.22 According to the terms of the arrange-
ment, the insurer, hospital system, and physicians’ 
association were given autonomy to redesign their care 
delivery systems to promote better coordination and 
improve efficiency. For example, they worked to elimi-
nate redundancies, such as having the same patient 
participate in multiple chronic disease management 
programs. At the end of the pilot period this past year, 
CalPERS estimated it saved $15.5 million through this 
“active purchasing” partnership and said it plans to 
expand the program.23 
States that choose to allow the exchange to 
selectively contract must think carefully about the 
trade-offs. There is value to having a broad choice 
of plans. However, once a health plan is a part of a 
network, if it has a sizable enrollment, it is hard to 
drop without causing a disruption of care and com-
munications that would allow people to fall through 
the cracks. However, a goal of active purchasing and 
of the exchanges is to raise the bar on quality and 
safety. There may be real promise to partnering with a 
relatively limited group of insurance carriers if these 
partnerships allow for innovative plans that enhance 
affordability and improve efficiency to be delivered 
to members. According to Sandra Shewry, a consul-
tant to the Schwarzenegger administration, the boards 
of the state-based exchanges “will have to balance 
choice with the idea that as purchasers they are adding 
value to the equation by asking the providers to keep 
improving.”
Adverse selection
In every state, the exchange boards will have to be very 
active in mitigating adverse selection among plans in 
the exchange, between the exchange and the outside 
market, and across market segments (e.g., individual, 
small-group, self-insured). Adverse selection occurs 
when actions by insurers or enrollees deliberately or 
inadvertently lead to a particular insurance risk pool 
of people who are substantially less healthy and more 
costly to insure. Once a poor risk profile has been 
developed for a particular product, it is difficult for 
the risk-bearing entity to remain financially viable. A 
review of the state’s experience with its small-business 
exchange emphasizes the importance of avoiding 
adverse selection and warns that “very strong measures 
are needed to prevent exchanges from falling into a 
death spiral.”24
The Affordable Care Act has several provisions 
that differentiate its exchanges from voluntary purchas-
ing pools such as PacAdvantage. First, the exchange 
is the only place in which individuals and businesses 
can receive subsidies and tax credits, which will create 
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a “captive audience.” This makes it less likely that the 
exchange will be selected against by the outside market 
because—particularly in states like California—the 
group is likely to be large enough to have an acceptable 
risk profile. Second, carriers within the exchange are 
required to offer products only at specified actuarial 
values (i.e., catastrophic, bronze, silver, gold, and plati-
num). This will help consumers make meaningful com-
parisons among products and may reduce somewhat 
the likelihood that plans will be adversely selected 
against within the exchange. Further, insurers are 
required to offer the same products at the same price 
both within and outside of the exchange. This also 
helps reduce selection against the exchange. The car-
riers who participated in PacAdvantage were unwill-
ing to offer the same price for the same product. This 
requirement has the important implication, though, that 
there can be no price advantage because of negotiating 
clout or administrative efficiencies for participating in 
the exchange. 
 Some carriers expressed concern that the struc-
ture created by these regulations will mean that the 
price negotiated by the exchange will effectively set 
the prices for the rest of the products both within and 
outside this market. They believe that because the rat-
ing factors allowed are very specific, any price change 
in a market segment for any product may require price 
changes for all the other products in the portfolio. The 
rating factors that are allowed are now limited to a very 
small set, including age and tobacco use. 
The full impact on market dynamics and prices 
is yet to be determined. It is clear, though, that ele-
ments of the reform law—in particular those related to 
exchanges—will have unforeseen implications for the 
private insurance market. There may also be signifi-
cant consequences for providers who depend on pay-
ments from the private insurers that participate in the 
exchange. In the individual market, where an exchange 
will have a long-term captive audience because of the 
subsidies, these new purchasing pools may indeed set 
prices for the market. The exchange cannot negotiate a 
better price exclusively for its enrollees, but its activi-
ties may bring down the price for all participants in 
the individual market. In the small-group market, on 
the other hand, the exchange may not have as great an 
effect on the prices in the market since the tax credits 
are of limited duration and there is no requirement 
for employers with fewer than 50 employees to offer 
coverage. Overall, the requirement that prices be equal 
inside and outside the exchanges means the California 
exchanges are less likely to be subject to adverse 
selection, but it also takes away an important putative 
advantage—lower prices.
California built upon federal legislation to 
reduce the likelihood of adverse selection within and 
against the exchange. First, while the federal legisla-
tion requires plans to offer only the silver and gold 
levels of coverage within the exchange, California 
requires plans to offer all levels of coverage. Critically, 
this requirement relates to plans whether or not they 
participate in the exchange. Therefore, there will be a 
direct comparison across all carriers in the market at 
these actuarial values. The exception to this is related 
to the second important regulation that California put 
in place: the restriction that plans can only offer the 
catastrophic coverage plan—and access the relatively 
young and healthy enrollees to whom this product will 
appeal—if they participate in the exchange. 
The federal law also includes a provision on 
statewide risk adjustment that applies to plans both in 
and outside the exchange. In theory, this should elimi-
nate most concerns about adverse selection because 
plans that have unhealthier pools will receive money 
from those with healthier ones. However, there are 
important caveats because risk adjustment, even under 
ideal circumstances, is imprecise. There is some dis-
agreement as to whether it was done effectively in the 
past, for example, within California’s small-business 
purchasing pool.25 But even assuming risk adjustment 
is done perfectly, it is designed to smooth differences 
within relatively narrow bands. If carriers’ payments 
to each other become very large proportions of total 
revenues, this may undermine the entire model. The 
subsidies paired with risk adjustment, therefore, will 
not guarantee success for the exchange either in terms 
of fulfilling its public purposes or succeeding as an 
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entity operating within the private market. Therefore, 
states should give serious consideration to adopting 
the further steps that California took to reduce adverse 
selection.
Coordination with public programs
The exchanges are designed to facilitate access to pri-
vate insurance and public programs. The Affordable 
Care Act directs the exchanges to determine eligibility 
for public programs for people who interact with the 
exchange. The state of California expanded on these 
responsibilities. Specifically, the board is required to 
“coordinate . . . eligibility, enrollment, and disenroll-
ment . . . with state and local government entities 
administering other health care coverage programs . . . 
and California counties, in order to ensure consistent 
eligibility and enrollment processes and seamless tran-
sitions between coverage.”26 
This topic has inspired a great deal of conversa-
tion in California. It was identified by the California 
Department of Health and Human Services as one of 
the key opportunities in federal reform. According to a 
state planning document, “important policy and infor-
mation technology systems issues will need to be care-
fully considered, including how the exchange’s eligi-
bility and enrollment functions will interact with Medi-
Cal (i.e., California’s Medicaid program), Healthy 
Families, and other public programs.”27 
Coordination among public programs was a 
complex issue in California even before the advent of 
the exchange. California is one of eight states with a 
stand-alone children’s health insurance program and, 
like many other states, it has a host of additional pro-
grams designed to assist specific populations such as 
women and infants, and children in need of specialty 
care. Because of the complexity of the market and 
the number of varying interests involved, California 
did not submit an application for a federal “Early 
Innovator” grant. These grants are for states that plan 
to use their exchanges to engage in technologically 
innovative methods to coordinate between public pro-
grams and private insurance coverage. 
Almost every task that is expected of the 
exchange, including consumer protection, risk man-
agement, and coordination with public programs, will 
require the development of new health information 
technology solutions and careful work to guarantee that 
these technologies interface seamlessly with legacy 
systems. Fortunately, a great deal of work has already 
been done. In California, this includes work on the 
Health-E-App and One-E-App systems. To as great an 
extent as possible, given the tightly compressed time-
line of implementation, states and the federal govern-
ment should build on existing efforts.28
Participation of Community-Based Health 
Plans and Co-ops
One associated policy question is whether commu-
nity-based health plans (e.g., county-based Medicaid 
managed care plans) will be allowed to develop com-
mercial offerings to compete with traditional private 
insurance products within the exchange. California’s 
legislation does not preclude Medicaid managed care 
plans from doing so. A separate piece of legislation that 
would have explicitly permitted their participation was 
not passed by the legislature. 
Once again, there are important trade-offs. 
Because community-based plans generally contract 
with lower-cost provider networks, they may be able 
to offer more affordable health insurance options to 
the newly subsidized populations. However, these 
providers are unlikely to accept rates from private 
insurance—even private insurance products created by 
Medicaid plans—that are as low as those they receive 
from the state’s Medicaid program. However, the plans 
may remain more affordable, and therefore appealing 
for the exchange, through the partnership with these 
lower-cost providers. 
There are substantial concerns, however, 
about capacity within the provider networks that con-
tract with managed care plans and the impact on the 
price of services this restriction on supply may cre-
ate. By increasing the demand for a resource without 
increasing the supply, the price is likely to increase. In 
addition, the workforce that serves this population is 
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unlikely to expand as quickly as demand and may be 
shrinking as physicians seek greater remuneration out-
side these programs.29 It is possible that instead of sig-
nificantly bringing down the cost of private insurance, 
this may instead raise the cost of services purchased 
on behalf of public entities. There are also significant 
administrative challenges for the community-based 
plans, which will have to increase their capacities and 
likely bring on additional staff to develop, modify, 
and service these products. One technical issue will 
be ascertaining which administrative costs should be 
charged to the public programs and which should be 
covered by the assessment on health plans levied by 
the exchange.
In California, the extent of commercial mar-
ket participation by community-based health plans is 
likely to vary by county and by the capacities of these 
plans.30 Some have larger staffs, more resources, and 
greater technical capabilities. A recent paper by Walter 
Zelman, current chair of the board of a community-
based health plan, reviews all the key issues related 
to exchange participation by community-based health 
plans in state exchanges.31 He observed that the statute 
empowers the exchange to provide individuals with 
“the option to remain enrolled with his or her carrier 
and provider network in the event the individual expe-
riences a loss of eligibility of premium tax credits. In 
all likelihood, one of the easiest means of achieving 
these goals is to facilitate the participation of Medi-
Cal plans in the exchange.” This may be in practice 
similar to the COBRA program in which people los-
ing employer coverage have the option of remaining 
enrolled in their employer plan if they pay the full 
unsubsidized amount for coverage.
Another complicating factor for California, 
as with other states, is whether it chooses to create 
a “Basic Health Plan.” The Basic Health Plan is an 
option under the Affordable Care Act to establish a new 
government program to cover individuals with incomes 
from 133 percent to 199 percent of the federal pov-
erty level.32 Instead of receiving subsidies through the 
exchange, qualifying individuals would instead be eli-
gible for a state-run program that uses 95 percent of the 
amount they would have received in federal subsidies 
to create a benefit package through a network of plans 
that contract with the state. The community-based 
health plans would be among the natural recipients of 
these contracts as they are accustomed to serving these 
populations and often already serve the children of the 
people eligible for the program. States that select the 
Basic Health Plan option, and hence reduce the number 
of people eligible for subsidies, may choose to limit the 
participation of community-based health plans in this 
new market. This issue has tremendous implications 
for state exchanges in terms of coordination across pro-
grams and also because it reduces the population eligi-
ble for subsidies to purchase private insurance through 
the exchanges. A recent study by Mercer estimated 
that of the approximately 2.6 million people expected 
to enroll in the California Health Benefit Exchange, 
roughly 725,000, or 30 percent, would be eligible only 
for the Basic Health Plan were the state to pursue  
this option.33 
CONCLUSION: A VISION FOR  
STATE-BASED EXCHANGES
While this brief has documented and analyzed the 
state-based coverage solutions chosen by California, 
each state will have to design solutions tailored to its 
own political, demographic, and market characteristics. 
There are technical decisions each state will have to 
make. Should the exchange be run by a nonprofit or a 
government agency? Which additional steps should it 
take to reduce adverse selection? 
In addition, each state must establish a vision 
of what it wishes to accomplish. For some states, it  
will simply be a more streamlined marketplace for  
consumers, which allows meaningful comparisons 
among products. States that choose to pursue a more 
active role for their exchange, on the other hand, may 
choose to have it focus on specific goals. Will the main 
focus be driving lower prices? Will it focus on shift- 
ing the delivery system toward greater integration? 
Will it hone in on patient safety? The board will need 
to be clear with the staff about priorities and states 
should be somewhat modest about what is possible  
to accomplish.
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Sandra Shewry points out that the exchange will 
not operate independently. There is, she remarks, “an 
opportunity to get in coalition with other purchasers, 
such as large employers and other state-funded pro-
grams, and pick a few key goals. It might be asthma 
outcomes or it could be heart disease. But I think that 
using purchasing as a tool for the ultimate goal is 
appropriate.” Shewry also emphasized the compressed 
timeline: “2014 is tomorrow and there are some very 
complex tasks given to the exchange. You need to sim-
plify eligibility and make a world-class, state-of-the-art 
experience for the people who are enrolling. That is 
going to mean partnering with Medicaid programs, 
with CHIP programs, and with other health and social 
programs.” 
The political principals and staff who designed 
the California exchange explicitly intended the board 
to have significant leeway in setting and achieving 
goals. Jon Kingsdale, the former executive director 
of the Commonwealth Connector, the Massachusetts 
state exchange, lays out the parameters in broader 
terms: “The authorizing legislation embodies a vision 
of California’s exchange as an agent of change in the 
marketplace. The governance model suggests this 
vision, as do the provisions that empower the exchange 
to selectively contract with health plans and to specify 
benefits and cost-sharing for all qualified health plans. 
They suggest an active hand in shaping the market with 
certain policy goals in mind. The goals are not pre-
scribed in legislation, but, instead, the board is encour-
aged to consider and act on such goals, rather than play 
a passive role.” 
Another important decision California made 
was to take steps to minimize adverse selection against 
the exchange and among plans within the exchange. 
Though it is impossible to predict the outcomes that 
these new structures will create, California was relying 
on wise policy guidance as well as on the hard lessons 
learned from its own uneven experience in these areas. 
Even plans that do not participate in the exchange must 
offer products at the bronze, silver, gold, and plati-
num levels. This should facilitate comparison among 
products market-wide. The board of the exchange may 
require plans that do participate to standardize their 
products and even to offer additional products. There is 
a significant enticement for plans to participate in the 
exchange beyond the subsidies created through fed-
eral reform. In California, insurance carriers are only 
allowed to offer catastrophic plans in the individual 
and small-group markets if they participate in the 
exchange. Though marketwide risk adjustment should 
reduce concerns about adverse selection, it will take 
time to refine the risk adjustment tools for this market. 
Insurance carriers will want to be able to pursue the 
under-30 population, for whom the more-affordable 
catastrophic plans may be an appealing option.
California’s process should also serve as a 
reminder to other states that, even when there is broad 
agreement among political leadership about federal 
reform, it is still very difficult to pass the enabling 
legislation. The process of setting up the exchange is 
even more complex and challenging, so states should 
proceed as quickly as is feasible. In designing the 
exchange, states should be collaborative but not make 
compromises that undercut the value proposition of 
these new marketplaces. In spite of the subsidies and 
provisions on elements like risk selection, exchanges 
are not guaranteed to succeed. Other purchasing pools 
in the past have failed. Fortunately, federal health care 
reform incorporates lessons from experiences with 
exchanges and allows states broad leeway to develop 
exchanges that work for their own marketplaces. States 
should make the most of that latitude.
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